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ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN GLOBAL
FRAND LITIGATION: THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Jorge L. Contreras, Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law. Harvard Law School (J.D.), Rice University (B.S.E.E. and B.A.)
Professor Contreras has written and lectured extensively on issues concerning technical
standardization, antitrust and intellectual property law and is the editor of the two-volume
Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law (2017, 2019).

The proliferation of international jurisdictional conflicts and competing “anti-suit injunctions” in
litigation over the licensing of standards-essential patents has raised concerns among policy
makers in the United States, Europe and China. This article suggests that national courts
temporarily “stand down” from assessing global “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory”
(FRAND) royalty rates while international bodies develop a more comprehensive, efficient and
transparent methodology for resolving issues around FRAND licensing.

Thanks to the decades-long efforts of international standards development organizations
(SDOs), today’s electronic devices seamlessly communicate and interconnect via widely-adopted
protocols like 4G/5G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB. Because of these standards, markets for
computers, networking equipment and communications devices have largely become global.
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Global product markets, however, also mean global litigation, and disputes over patents covering
some of these standards (so-called “standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”) are routinely fought
in a half-dozen or more jurisdictions around the world.
The crux of many of these disputes is whether a SEP holder has honored the commitment
that it has made to an SDO to license SEPs to manufacturers of standardized products (often called
“implementers”) on terms that are fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”). Because
there is no generally accepted definition of FRAND, and SDOs offer little guidance regarding its
details, disputes have arisen regarding the royalty rates and other terms that SEP holders must offer
to potential licensees.1

National versus Global FRAND Rates
Courts adjudicating such FRAND disputes face a dilemma. On one hand, patents are issued
under national law and, by definition, have legal effect only in the issuing jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with operations (and
patents) in jurisdictions around the world. In determining a FRAND royalty rate, a court must
decide whether to focus only on the patents issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or to
consider the global business relationship between the parties. Even though a national court
typically lacks authority to adjudicate damages with respect to the infringement of foreign patents,
the fact that FRAND disputes are essentially contractual disputes gives a national court the
jurisdictional authority to determine a global rate for the portfolio licensed under the agreement in
question (as opposed to infringement damages for patents in other jurisdictions).2
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In some cases, courts have limited their assessment of FRAND royalties to the national
patents that have been asserted. These cases include Microsoft v. Motorola,3 In re. Innovatio,4
Ericsson v. D-Link,5 and Optis v. Huawei.6 In each of these cases, a U.S. district judge or jury
determined a FRAND royalty rate and awarded damages to the SEP holder based on the valid and
infringed U.S. patents.
However, in 2017 the UK High Court for Patents ruled in Unwired Planet v. Huawei,7 that
it was authorized to dictate the terms of a global FRAND license between the parties, covering not
only the SEP holder’s UK patents, but also foreign patents covered by its FRAND commitment.
A similar approach was taken by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in
TCL v. Ericsson,8 though its determination was made with the consent of both parties. Most
recently, courts in China have proven willing to assess FRAND royalty rates on a global basis (see
below).
The ability of one national court to determine FRAND rates on a global basis can lead to
two forms of legal “race”. First is a “race to the bottom” among jurisdictions — a well-documented
phenomenon in which jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules, procedures and substantive
outlook to attract litigants.9 Second, differences among jurisdictions are likely to encourage parties
to initiate litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction possible as quickly as possible, often to
foreclose a later suit in a less favorable jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race to
judgment” or a “race to the courthouse,” which may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather
than negotiation or settlement.10
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Anti-Suit Injunctions in FRAND Cases
An anti-suit injunction (ASI) is an interlocutory in personam remedy issued by a court in
one jurisdiction to prohibit a litigant from initiating or continuing parallel litigation in another
jurisdiction. ASIs have been issued in a wide range of international commercial, antitrust and
bankruptcy actions.11 In recent years, however, the most significant use of ASIs has been in
connection with global FRAND disputes. Specifically, a court reviewing a SEP holder’s
compliance with a FRAND licensing commitment may issue an ASI to prevent the SEP holder
from pursuing foreign FRAND rate determination or infringement claims until the first court has
completed its adjudication of the licensing terms.
In the United States, courts considering the issuance of ASIs follow some variant of the
three-part framework developed by the Ninth Circuit in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores.12
Under the Gallo framework, a court must first determine whether the parties and the issues in the
action in which the ASI is sought (the local action) are functionally equivalent to those in the action
sought to be enjoined (the foreign action). If so, the court must determine whether resolution of
the local action would be dispositive of the foreign action. Then the court must assess whether any
of the four factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in In re Unterweser Reederei13 are present. These
factors include whether the foreign litigation would (1) frustrate a policy of the issuing forum; (2)
be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s jurisdiction; or (4) prejudice other
equitable considerations. If at least one of the Unterweser factors is present, the court must ask
whether the injunction will have a significant impact on international comity.14 If not, then the ASI
may be issued.
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ASIs in FRAND Cases
The first notable ASI in a FRAND case was issued in Microsoft v. Motorola,15 the facts of
which are fairly typical. In that case, Microsoft alleged that Motorola breached its commitment to
offer a FRAND license and sued Motorola for breach of contract in the Western District of
Washington. Six months later, Motorola sued Microsoft for patent infringement in Germany. The
German court, finding infringement, enjoined Microsoft from selling infringing products in
Germany. In response, Microsoft sought an ASI from the Washington court to prevent Motorola
from enforcing the German injunction. The Washington court, finding that the resolution of the
U.S. matter would dispose of the German matter (i.e., if Motorola were found in the U.S. to have
breached its FRAND obligations, then Motorola would not be entitled to seek injunctive relief
against Microsoft in any jurisdiction, including Germany), entered the ASI against Motorola. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Several other ASI actions followed in U.S. FRAND cases including Vringo v. ZTE,16 TCL
v. Ericsson,17 Apple v. Qualcomm,18 Optis v. Huawei,19 and Huawei v. Samsung.20 The courts
granted ASIs in about half of these cases (see Table 1).21

The Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction (AASI)
By 2018, international litigants and courts began to resist the imposition of ASIs by U.S.
courts through anti-anti-suit injunctions (AASIs). Like an ASI, an AASI operates in personam,
prohibiting a litigant from taking a particular action, rather than purporting to restrain the authority
of a foreign court.22
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In IPCom v. Lenovo,23 a U.S. district court granted an ASI preventing IPCom from
pursuing parallel infringement litigation outside the U.S.. In response, IPCom brought an action in
France seeking to prevent Lenovo from enforcing the U.S. ASI. The French court granted the
AASI, holding that, except under certain circumstances, ASIs are contrary to French ordre public,
and that “seeking an anti-suit injunction — such as the one pursued by Lenovo in California —
would infringe upon IPCom’s fundamental rights pursuant to French laws.”24 A UK court also
issued an AASI in favor of IPCom, reasoning that “it would be vexatious and oppressive to IPCom
if it were deprived entirely of its right to litigate infringement and validity of [its UK patent].”25
A German court responded similarly in Continental v. Avanci,26 issuing an AASI to prevent
the enforcement of a U.S. ASI that sought to prevent a number of SEP holders from pursuing
litigation in Germany.27 The German court found that the requested ASI would have been
incompatible with German law.28

China Takes Center Stage
Though Chinese judicial actions have been the targets of ASI motions in U.S. cases since
at least 2015, it wasn’t until 2020 that Chinese courts began to issue ASIs of their own. Then,
during the course of 2020 alone, Chinese courts issued an unprecedented four ASIs in major
FRAND cases.
Three of these cases, Conversant v. Huawei,29 InterDigital v. Xiaomi30 and OPPO v.
Sharp,31 involved a non-Chinese company’s assertion of SEPs against a Chinese manufacturer. In
each case, the Chinese court granted the ASI, enjoining parallel actions in Germany (Conversant),
India (InterDigital), and Japan, Taiwan and Germany (OPPO).32 In Conversant and InterDigital,
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the Chinese court imposed a penalty of RMB 1 million (approximately US$150,000) per day for
any violation of the ASI. In response to these Chinese ASIs, courts in Germany33 and India34 issued
AASIs in InterDigital, and a court in Germany did so in OPPO.35
Unlike the other three Chinese cases, Ericsson v. Samsung did not directly involve a
Chinese party (Ericsson is Swedish and Samsung is South Korean). The case involved an existing
SEP cross-license between Samsung and Ericsson that was due to expire at the end of 2020. On
December 7, Samsung sought a FRAND royalty rate determination for Ericsson’s SEPs in the
Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court. On December 11, Ericsson sued Samsung for infringement
in the Eastern District of Texas. In response, Samsung asked the Wuhan court for an ASI
preventing Ericsson from seeking relief in the U.S. On December 25, the Wuhan court issued the
ASI, which also prohibited Ericsson from seeking to negate the ASI in Texas (i.e., an AAASI).36
The Texas court quickly issued a temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction,
prohibiting Samsung’s enforcement of the Wuhan ASI and requiring Samsung to indemnify
Ericsson against any penalties imposed by the Wuhan court.37 The remarkably rapid actions and
counter actions in this case exemplify the “race to the courthouse” discussed above.
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ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS
Table 1

Summary of Anti-Suit Injunctions and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued in FRAND Cases
Case

Year

ASI Filed

Foreign Juris.

ASI
Granted

AASI Issued

Microsoft v. Motorola

2012

U.S.

Germany

Yes

N/A

Vringo v. ZTE

2015

U.S.

China

No

N/A

TCL v. Ericsson

2015

U.S.

France, Brazil,
Russia, UK,
Germany, Argentina

Yes

N/A

Apple v. Qualcomm

2017

U.S.

UK, Japan, China,
Taiwan

No

N/A

Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE

2018

UK

China

Yes*

N/A

Optis v. Huawei

2018

U.S.

China

No

N/A

Huawei v. Samsung

2018

U.S.

China

Yes

N/A

Continental v. Avanci

2019

U.S.

Germany

N/A

Yes

IPCom v. Lenovo

2019

U.S.

UK, France

N/A

Yes x2

Conversant v. Huawei

2020

China

Germany

Yes

N/A

InterDigital v. Xiaomi

2020

China

India, Germany

Yes

Yes x2

Yes

Yes (Ger.)

Yes

Yes

OPPO v. Sharp

2020

China

Germany, Japan,
Taiwan

Ericsson v. Samsung

2020

China

U.S.

Concern from Policy Makers
The complexity, cost and unpredictability of high-stakes global FRAND disputes have
increased markedly with the introduction of ASIs, AASIs and AAASIs, and policy makers around
the world have taken notice. For example, the U.S. Trade Representative, in her 2021 Special 301
Report, specifically identified China’s increased use of ASIs as “worrying” in the context of
international trade.38 In its 2020 Intellectual Property Action Plan, the European Commission
observed that “very broad extraterritorial anti-suit injunctions” are particularly challenging to
European companies operating internationally.39 And in July, 2021, the European Union issued a
formal request for information to China under Section 63.3 of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, asking
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for clarification, among other things, regarding the legal basis for blocking the enforcement of
European actions in Conversant and OPPO.40
Despite these expressions of concern, strategic races to the courthouse will likely continue
until a more rational, transparent and comprehensive system for determining FRAND royalty rates
is established. In the past, I have proposed a number of potential solutions to the FRAND litigation
race and the inefficient, non-transparent and inconsistent negotiation of FRAND royalties,
including the use of interpleader to determine aggregate FRAND royalty rates in a single
proceeding that involves all interested parties,41 the collective negotiation of aggregate royalty
rates at the standard level,42 and the establishment of a non-governmental FRAND rate-setting
tribunal.43 Professor Thomas Cotter has suggested that national governments seek to develop
consensus, or at least best practices, around certain contentious FRAND calculation issues, which
could alleviate “race to the bottom” concerns that arise from current jurisdictional differences.44
And the European Commission’s Expert Group on Standards Essential Patents has made a range
of proposals, both substantive and procedural.45 Yet each of these reforms will take time to
develop, enact and implement. So can should be done in the meantime to stem the increasing
incidence of jurisdictional clashes in global FRAND litigation?

Judicial Restraint and FRAND Litigation
As noted above, a court confronted with a global FRAND case has two basic choices. It
may determine FRAND royalty rates associated with national patents issued in its jurisdiction, or
it may determine the FRAND royalty rates applicable around the world. The latter option,
pioneered by the UK courts in Unwired Planet and now embraced by courts in the U.S. and China,
has led to the jurisdictional competition exemplified by the cases discussed above. It is the first
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option – a court’s limitation of its decision to the patents issued in its own jurisdiction – that will
eliminate costly and chaotic jockeying for position among courts and parties. This approach was
adequate for the “first generation” of FRAND royalty determination cases (Microsoft v. Motorola,
Innovatio, and Ericsson v. D-Link) and is grounded in judicial restraint and international comity.
Thus, while courts around the world may have the legal authority to determine global
FRAND rates, doing so may not be in the best interests of the parties or the market. Accordingly,
courts that are considering FRAND cases should voluntarily refrain from determining global
FRAND rates and instead limit their determinations to royalty rates for patents issued in their own
jurisdictions, at least until a more effective global system is in place to assess FRAND rates on a
comprehensive basis.
While some predict that such a voluntary relinquishment of global rate-setting authority
could result in FRAND rates that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,46 this is not an undesirable
result, given that patent portfolios, substantive patent laws, and product markets also vary from
country to country. Moreover, the inconsistency that individual parties may experience by having
FRAND rates vary from country to country may, in fact, lend greater consistency to the global
FRAND licensing market, as it will eliminate the extreme variations in global FRAND rates that
occur from party to party. National patent royalty rates are the norm in patent disputes. The fact
that parties may privately negotiate blanket royalty rates in global license agreements does not
change the national character of patent law, and until patent law is unified through a single, global
system (an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future), courts will, and should, continue to
adjudicate patent remedies on a national basis.47
There are numerous ways to coordinate international judicial activity to achieve this accord
short of formal treaty agreements, which are time-consuming and politically fraught. Judges from
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around the world meet regularly at events sponsored by the International Bar Association, the
American Bar Association International Law Section and other groups. The U.S.-based Judicial
Conference Committee on International Judicial Relations coordinates interactions between
members of the U.S. judiciary and foreign judicial systems,48 the American Law Institute has
developed a comprehensive set of principles governing jurisdiction, choice of law and judgments
in transnational disputes,49 and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is
coordinating an international effort on patent case adjudication in which, among others, the
Chinese courts are currently participating.50 Any of these organizations could serve as a focal point
for much-needed informal harmonization of judicial practices regarding global FRAND disputes.

Conclusion
The proliferation of international jurisdictional conflicts and competing anti-suit
injunctions in FRAND litigation has raised legitimate concerns among policy makers around the
world. Such conflicts have already resulted in the predicted “race to the courthouse” and “race to
the bottom” in FRAND disputes, with no end in sight. This essay suggests that, in order to give
international bodies time to develop a more comprehensive, efficient and transparent methodology
for resolving FRAND licensing issues, national courts should voluntarily “stand down” from
assessing global FRAND royalty rates and instead limit their adjudication to royalties covering
patents issued within their own jurisdictions. While such a limitation on judicial authority is not
mandated by national law or international agreement, this modest exercise of judicial restraint
could clear the way for these important issues to be resolved in a more rational, transparent and
balanced manner.
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